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"dynamite" was not to be "exploded before
there was any reason to think that blasting
was necessary. '2 5 At Walker's trial when
the court inquired whether the jury, after
four and one-half hours of deliberation, desired any further assistance in regard to
the law, the foreman replied: "Your Honor, we think we will reach a verdict soon.
We don't think we are very far from it."'26
There was obviously no deadlock. Yet, the
"Allen charge" was given.
A use of the charge, such as that
approved by the instant Court, is ostensibly contrary to established precedent. It
is true that precedent is often overturned,
just as it is true that dissenting opinions become law. But it is rare that good law
evolves from a disregard of a sound judicial premise. In Walker it seems that the
Court disregarded the relevant proposition

First Conviction Under
New York Barratry Statute
Appellant was convicted of common
barratry on proof that he had personally,
with malicious intent, instituted nine
groundless claims, actions or legal proceedings against the complainant in small
claims and municipal courts. The Court of
Appeals, in affirming the first conviction
for barratry in the history of New York
State, 1 held that Section 323 of the New
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Commonwealth v. Moore, 398 Pa. 198, 157

A.2d 65 (1959).
28 Cases cited note 24 supra.
29 Green v. United States, supra note 24, at 854.

York Penal Law had modified the common-law rule so as to render one guilty of
common barratry who has himself, corruptly or maliciously instituted at least
three groundless actions or legal proceedings. 2 People v. Budner, 15 N.Y.2d 253,
206 N.E.2d 171, 258 N.Y.S.2d 73
(1965).
ever, the appellate division reversed upon a finding, inter alia, that the prosecution had failed to
prove malice. People v. Budner, 13 App. Div.
2d 253, 215 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1st Dep't 1961).

Section 323 reads: "Upon a conviction for
common barratry, the fact that the defendant was
himself a party in interest or upon the record to
any action or legal proceeding complained of is
2

1It is interesting to note that the appellant was
previously convicted of barratry in 1961. How-
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that "a verdict brought about by judicial
coercion is a nullity in the eyes of the
law."' 21 With proper and due deference to
the implication of the Court's instruction,
the minority juror could only comply by
yielding his conviction. Is this not an application of pressure by the Court?
In his separate opinion, Judge Brown
quoted Judge Wisdom's opinion in Green
v. United States:28 "the Allen or 'dynamite'
charge is designed to blast loose a deadlocked jury. . . . There is no justification
29
whatever for its coercive use."
The charge, as used in Walker, is apparently improper. When functioning within
its limits, the "Allen charge" harmonizes
divergent views without unduly influencing
the minority juror. But when it exceeds
these limits, it is as offensive as the ancient
common-law practices.
27

25 Green v. United States, supra note 24, at 856.
26 Walker v. United States, supra note 22, at 25.
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At early common law, barratry was the
practice of encouraging or maintaining
suits or quarrels in the courts by (1) disturbing the peace, (2) taking or detaining
the possession of property in question by
subtlety and deceit, or (3) fostering calumny resulting in discord between neighbors.3 Later, the definition was expanded
to include any incitement of litigation be4
tween subjects of the King.
In order to sustain a conviction for barratry at common law, it was necessary to
show that the offender had incited litigation in several instances5 and had not
brought any of the suits in his own rightS'
It was not a defense to claim that malicious
intent or an intent to vex and annoy was
lacking. 7 In addition, it was immaterial
that the suits were in fact meritorious. 8
At common law, there was a strong
aversion to the institution of litigation. 9
Barratry, -and its sister offenses, chainperty10 and maintenance, 1 were based on
3The Case of Barratry, 77 Eng. Rep. 528, 8
Co. Rep. 36b (1588). There are several deriva-

tions of the term "barratry." Some say that it is
derived from the French word barrateur signifying "deceiver," while others contend it is derived
from the Latin word baratro which signifies a
"vile knave." Another theory regarding the ori-

gin of the word is based upon its usage and stems
from two legal terms: barra meaning "the courtroom bar" at which cases were argued and retturn meaning "offense." Literally then, a barrator

is a "bar offender." Id. at 529, 8 Co. Rep. at
37b.
4 EHRLICH, EHRLICH'S BLACKSTONE

802 (1st ed.

1959).
5 Voorhees

v. Dorr, 51 Barb. 580, 587 (N.Y.
1868); 9 C.J.S. Barratry § 2(b) (1938).
6 1 RUSSELL, CRIMES 371 (10th ed. 1950).
7See PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 454 (1957). But
see State v. Batson, 220 N.C. 411, 17 S.E.2d 511
(1941).
8 State v. Chitty, 17 S.C. (1 Bail.) 379 (1830).
9 1 RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note 6.
10 Champerty was an agreement whereby the

champertor agreed to pay the expenses of a suit

a "mind your own business" philosophy
which was, at one time, carried to the extreme of making it criminal for one to testify at a trial without having been pre2
viously subpoenaed.'
In New York, barratry is defined as "the
practice of exciting groundless judicial proceedings."' 3 Although the barratry statutes
have been in effect since 1881, and although barratry was a crime at common
law in New York, until 1965 there had
never been 'a sustained conviction for the
crime

14

In the instant case, the appellant ordered a suit of clothes to be made by the
complainant. Subsequently, the appellant
returned the suit, claiming that it did not
fit properly. Thereafter, he instituted nine
claims or other actions against the complainant. All of these actions, with the exception of two in which the appellant
obtained default judgments, were either
dismissed or resulted in a decision for complainant. 15
Judge Van Voorhis, speaking for the
majority, stated that although a conviction
could not have been had at common law
against a party to the litigation, Section
323 of the Penal Law was clearly intended
by the legislature to modify that princi-

in return for a share of the land or other matter
sued for, should the suit be successful. PERKINS,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 449.

"1Maintenance was an officious intermeddling in
a suit that in no way concerned the intermeddler.
It was an offense against public justice because
it fostered strife and contention and perverted
the remedial processes of the law. PERKINS, Op.
cit. supra note 7, at 448.
12PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 449; see 1
RUSSELL, op. cit. supra note 6.

13 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 320.

See People v. Budner, supra note I.
People v. Budner, 15 N.Y.2d 253, 255, 206
N.E.2d 171, 258 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (1965).
14

'5

11
ple. 16 The statute was thus interpreted as
rendering amenable to criminal prosecution one who is himself a party to barratrous litigation.
Chief Judge Desmond dissented on the
ground that the legislature never contemplated a change in the common-law rule
which precluded a prosecution for barratry
when the "common barrator" had brought
the actions in his own right. He reasoned

that the only change from the common-law
rule is that a person cannot now elude
liability under the statute by joining himself as a party to an action brought by an17
other.
Despite Judge Desmond's interpretation,
there is a wide disparity between the statutory and the common-law requirements for
a conviction of barratry. The statutes substitute specific criminal intent for the general criminal intent formerly required, and
dictate that the litigation be groundless, a
requirement non-existent at common law."'
The wording of section 323 that "the fact
that the defendant was himself a party in
interest or upon the record, is not a defense" also indicates a deviation from the
common-law rule.
The decision as it stands does not portend any major changes in the course of
litigation in New York or in the choice of
remedies available to one harassed by vexatious suits. The tort action of malicious
prosecution would seem to be the more
appropriate remedy, if the plaintiff can
show that his person or property was in-
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terfered with by legal process. 19 The
stringent requirements needed for conviction in a criminal case may motivate a
person harassed by vexatious actions to
seek the civil rather than the criminal
remedy. For example, a criminal conviction of barratry requires a showing that
the offender had instigated at least three
groundless proceedings with malicious intent. 20 This must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 21 In addition, the complainant is unable to recover damages and
can merely have the satisfaction of seeing
22
the offender imprisoned or fined.
On the other hand, if an action is
brought civilly for malicious prosecution,
the plaintiff may recover damages. 23 It is
not necessary to prove that three suits were
instituted, or to prove the offender's malicious intent beyond a reasonable doubt. 24 It
is important to bear in mind, however,
that although the tort remedy may be preferable to a criminal action, institution of
one does not necessarily preclude the
other.
The decision in Budner, although it will
not engender a major change in the law, is
a step in the direction of preventing serious abuses of our judicial system. Since
the remedy of malicious prosecution may
not always be available to defendants in
civil actions it is clear that, while barratry
will not be a primary recourse for harassed
defendants, it will be an important deterrent to the use of the courts solely for the
purpose of vexing certain individuals.

4 CARMODY-WAIT, CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK
PRACTICE § 162 (1953).
20 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 322.
21 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497 (3d ed. 1940).
22 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 321.
'9

16 Id. at 256, 206 N.E.2d at 172, 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 75.
17 Id. at 257, 206 N.E.2d at 173, 258 N.Y.S.2d
at 76.
18 PERKINS, op. cit. supra note 7, at 454.
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2

3

See PROSSER, TORTS 868 (3d ed. 1964).
op. cit. supra note 21, § 2498.

24 9 WIGMORE,
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No Negative Inference from
Defendant's Refusal to Testify
Petitioner was convicted of murder in a
state court after a trial during which the
prosecutor had commented extensively on
his refusal to take the stand. The court had
instructed the jury that, while the defendant had a constitutional right not to testify,
they might reasonably infer the truth of
alleged facts which were within petitioner's
knowledge but which he refused to deny
or explain. The Supreme Court of the
United States reversed the conviction and
held that the prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination contained in the
fifth amendment, and made applicable to
the states by the fourteenth amendment,
forbids both comment by the prosecutor on
the accused's silence and instructions by
the court that such silence is evidence of
guilt. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965).
At common law, during the period of
the Star Chamber and Court of High
Commission, there existed an inquisitional
system of criminal justice.' Defendants
were summoned into court, often merely as
suspects, and were compelled to answer
numerous questions covering a wide range
of topics. 2 In response to this type of "justice" there evolved a common-law privilege against compelling self-incriminating
testimony.3 This privilege later became a
rule of law which prohibited the defendant
in a criminal case from being a witness,
4
even if he so desired.
18

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250 I(1)(b)(i)-(2)
(b) (McNaughton's rev. ed. 1961).
2 Id. at 1(3); see also Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609, 620 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
3 8 WIGMORE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 1(3); see
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91 (1908).
4 See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 65
(1893).

In the United States, as a reaction to
inquisitional criminal "justice" and other
abuses which existed during colonial
times,5 a provision against self-incrimination was included in the fifth amendment. 6
Congress, however, found the common-law
rule, preventing a defendant from being a
witness, inequitable when applied to a defendant who was able, by his testimony, to
prove his innocence. Accordingly, a federal statute was passed which permitted the
defendant in federal courts to testify if he
so wished.7 It was made explicit, however,
that his failure to testify created no presumption of guilt against him.
Under this statute the Supreme Court,
as early as 1893, decided that it was reversible error in a federal court for the
prosecutor or judge to comment on the
failure of the defendant to testify. The
rule against "comment" was further enlarged by the Supreme Court in the case of
Bruno v. United States,9 which held that,
by virtue of the statute, the defendant in a
federal court had the right to have the jury
5 Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 783-89 (1935).

'The fifth amendment reads inpart: "No person .. .shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself .. " The consti-

tution of every state except Iowa and New Jersey contains a prohibition against self-incrimination. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 2252,
n.1.
7

"[[In the trial of all indictments, informations,

complaints, and other proceedings against per-

sons charged with the commission of crimes,
offences, and misdemeanors, in the United States
Courts . . . the person so charged shall, at his
own request, but not otherwise, be a competent
witness. And his failure to make such request
shall not create any presumption against hi."

20 Stat. 30 (1878); 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1948).
(Emphasis added.)

'Wilson v.United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893).
9308 U.S. 287 (1939).

11
instructed that his failure to testify created
no presumption against him. It is important to note that these cases, and in
fact all of the federal cases dealing with
"comment," are based on federal statutes
and not directly on the right against selfincrimination contained in the fifth amendment. 0
It was decided early that the bill of
rights had no direct applicability to the
states, but merely acted as a restraint upon
the federal government.11 In 1908, however, in Twining v. New Jersey,12 it was
argued before the Supreme Court that the
states were forbidden from commenting on
the failure of a defendant to take the stand.
The bases for this contention were: first,
the fifth amendment's protection against
self-incrimination prohibits "comment";
and, secondly, the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination is binding upon the states by virtue of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amend13
ment.
The Court assumed that the fifth amendment did protect against "comment" but
found that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment did not protect a
defendant in a state criminal proceeding
from self-incrimination.

1

4

In 1947, the same issue was before the
Court in the case of Adamson v. California.1 5 Although the Court held that the
10 See, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1,

2 (1960); Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301,
304-05 (1895).
"I Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243
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fourteenth amendment guaranteed a defendant in a state court a fair trial, it found
that the privilege against self-incrimination
was not so essential to a fair trial as to
be included within the scope of the due
process clause.16
In 1964, the Supreme Court, in Malloy
v. Hogan,'1 7 held for the first time that a
defendant in a state criminal proceeding
was protected against self-incrimination by
the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court based its decision
on the fact that the foundation of the
American system of criminal justice is accusatorial rather than inquisitional, and
that its essential mainstay is the provision
of the fifth amendment that no person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself."'
In the instant case the Supreme Court
held that the federal rule prohibiting comment on the failure of the defendant to testify is part of the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination.
The Court believed that "comment" is a
remnant of the "inquisitorial system of
criminal justice" 19 and, therefore, is forbidden by the fifth amendment.2 The Court
also found that when a judge or a prosecutor comments on a defendant's silence, that
silence is, in effect, being offered to the
jury as evidence against him. Therefore,
the defendant is being penalized for exercising a constitutional right. 21 The Court
next reaffirmed its earlier holding that once
a right contained in the bill of rights is

(1833).

12 211 U.S. 78 (1908).

13The fourteenth amendment reads in part:
"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law .. "
14 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114
(1908).
15 332 U.S. 46 (1947).

16

Id. at 53.

378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).
19 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52,
17
18

55 (1964).
Griffin
(1965).

20
21

Ibid.

v. California,

380

U.S.

609,

614

RECENT DECISIONS

deemed applicable to the states, the minimal standard for determining a violation of
this right is to be the same whether the
right is violated in a state court or in a
federal court. 22 Hence, the minimum rights
which a defendant possesses in a state
criminal court with reference to selfincrimination must be the same as those
which accrue to him in a federal court.
The dissenters expressed the view that
"comment" was not a violation of due
process of law as such. 23 They did not believe that the "no comment" rule was part
of the fifth amendment, but rather, contended that comment on the failure of the
defendant to testify was a procedural
matter, which, while regulated in the federal courts by statute, should be left to
24
local regulation in the state courts.
As a direct result of Griffin, the criminal
procedure of six states has been altered.
(These states allowed comment by the
prosecutor and/or judge on the failure of
the defendant to take the stand.2 5) The
22

See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
(prohibition against self-incrimination contained
in the fifth amendment made applicable to the
states); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (right to counsel contained in the sixth
amendment made applicable to the states); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure contained in the fourth amendment made applicable
to the states).
23Griffin v. California, supra note 20, at 619
(dissenting opinion).
24 id. at 623.
25 "Of the six States which permit comment, two,
California and Ohio, give this permission by
means of an explicit constitutional qualification
of the privilege against self-incrimination. Cal.
Const. Art. I, § 13; Ohio Const. Art. I, § 10.
New Jersey permits comment, State v. Corby, 28
N.J. 106, 145 A.2d 289 . . . but its constitution
contains no provision embodying the privilege
against self-incrimination. .

.

. The absence of

an express constitutional privilege against self-

Court did not indicate whether the decision in the instant case will be applied retroactively in these six states. Presumably
it will, since this has been the previous
policy of the Supreme Court with regard
to procedure which has been found to violate due process.
The instant case is a good illustration
of the recent trend making federal criminal
procedure based on the bill of rights applicable to the states by "absorption" into
the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.26 This trend has resulted in
the creation of a degree of uniformity in
the procedural safeguards afforded defendants in state as well as federal criminal
proceedings.
It is important to note, however, that
despite this trend there will probably never
be complete uniformity of standards since
Congress and the Supreme Court possess a
supervisory power over procedure in the
federal courts which they do not possess
over state courts. 27 It is only constitutional
standards which can be made applicable to
the states through due process, and not
federal criminal procedure based on statute
or rules of the Supreme Court.
This distinction gives rise to a most important question which Griffin leaves unincrimination also puts Iowa among the six. See

State v. Ferguson, 226 Iowa 361, 372-373, 283
N.W. 917, 923. Connecticut permits comment by
the judge but not by the prosecutor. State v.

Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 A. 181, 94 A.L.R. 696.
New Mexico permits comment by the prosecutor

but holds that the accused is then entitled to an
instruction that 'the jury shall indulge no pre-

sumption against the accused because of his failure to testify'. N.M.Stat.Ann. § 41-12-19; State

v. Sandoval, 59 N.M. 85, 279 P.2d 850." Griffin
v. California, supra note 20, at 611-12 n.3.
26 See note 22 supra.
27 See DOWLING, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 668 n.5
(6th ed. 1959).

11
answered, viz., is the defendant in a state
court entitled to the instruction that his
failure to testify creates no presumption
against him? The defendant in a federal
court is entitled to this instruction, but the
basis for this right has always been merely
28
statutory.
It appears that when the question does
arise the Supreme Court will hold that such
instruction is required, since an inference
of guilt drawn by a jury would penalize a
defendant for exercising his constitutional
9
right."
As previously noted, the recent trend
of the Supreme Court has been to "absorb" specific procedural safeguards of the
bill of rights into the due process clause
thereby making them applicable to the
states.30 From a moral and logical point
28See Bruno v. United

States, 308 U.S.

287

(1939).
29See Griffin v. California, supra note 20, at
614-15.
0 See note 22 supra.

State not Required
to Provide Counsel
on Appeal to Supreme Court
Appellant, an indigent, was convicted of
escaping from an honor farm of the state
penitentiary. He filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the district court, asserting that
the rights afforded him by the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment had been violated by
the refusal of the Supreme Court of New
Mexico to appoint counsel to assist him in
appealing to the United States Supreme
Court. The district court denied relief. The
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of view, there seems to be little doubt that
a defendant in a state criminal prosecution
should be protected by the fundamental
procedural safeguards found in the bill of
rights. However, one vital question still
remains: is the Supreme Court constitutionally justified in finding that these procedural safeguards are contained in the
due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
If, as a minority of the Justices have
stated, the Court has expanded the concept
of due process beyond all rational basis,",
then the Supreme Court has, in effect,
usurped the authority of Congress and has
effected by judicial decision what can properly be done only by constitutional amendment.

31 See,

e.g., Mr. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Malloy v. Hogan, supra note 22, at 14;
see also Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78
HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965).

Court of Appeals affirmed and held that a
state court is not required to appoint counsel for an indigent in taking such an appeal. Peters v. Cox, 341 F.2d 575 (10th
Cir. 1965).
The right to counsel has been recognized
in federal criminal proceedings since the
adoption of the federal constitution.' Although the unqualified right existed, the
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in part that "In

all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence."

